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Malicious Prosecution Suits As Counterbalance
To Medical Malpractice Suits
Allen P. Adler*
A FEW YEARS AGO medical malpractice suits were something of a
rarity in the United States.1 They now appear to be a major national
problem.' The magnitude of this ever increasing problem can be illus-
trated by the fact that a Senate subcommittee, chaired by Sen.
Abraham Ribicoff, has investigated the increase in malpractice liti-
gation and that President Nixon has ordered the establishment of a
Commission on Medical Malpractice, under the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, to research the problem and report a possible
solution by March 1, 1972. 3
There are no accurate figures available on the overall increase in
medical malpractice litigation.4 It is estimated that malpractice claims
have increased at the rate of 10% per year for the last five years.5
The Aetna Life and Casualty Company reports a 43% increase in
claims filed against its policy holders between 1964 and 1969.6 Craw-
ford Morris, a Cleveland attorney, reports a 400% increase in the
number of cases in which he has been called upon to defend doctors
between 1955 and 1966.7
It is estimated that between 6,000 and 9,000 suits are brought
against the 250,000 practicing physicians in the United States each
year.8 An investigation by the American Medical Association shows
that one doctor in six now practicing in the United States has been
sued for malpractice.9 The A.M.A. also estimates that one doctor in
four will be sued before the end of his career. 10
Along with the increase in the number of malpractice actions,
the size of the individual claim has increased. There has been a 200%
increase in the claim cost in the last five years."1 The Nettleship
Company of Los Angeles, a medical malpractice insurance carrier,
reports an increase in the average closing cost of claims from $2,478.00
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in 1957 to $13,325.00 in 1970. These figures include investigation costs,
adjustments, defense fees, and settlements.12
The above figures go a long way in explaining the rapidly in-
creasing premiums of medical malpractice insurance. Rates increased
110% in California in 1969.13 The rates in Utah, for the year 1969,
were thirteen times what they had been in 1967.14 Individual prem-
iums as high as $10,000.00 per year have been reported.15 These
premium increases, like any other cost of doing business, are passed
on to the general public.16
Along with the increase in cost, the increase of malpractice liti-
gation is reflected in the way medicine is practiced. There is marked
caution in diagnostic procedure and in the prescription of drugs. This
offshoot of the malpractice dilemma does not appear to be all bad.'7
There have been several suggested cures for the increase in mal-
practice litigation and the accompanying costs to the medical pro-
fession and society as a whole. These cures run from malpractice
group insurance and government financed re-insurance pools for
doctors who have lost their coverage, to the proposed establishment
of local boards of lawyers and doctors to arbitrate malpractice
claims.' 8 These boards would function much like the one now in
existence in Pima County, Arizona. It has also been suggested that
patients buy a "no fault" type of insurance that would operate along
the lines of workman's compensation or airline trip coverage.19 The
abolition of the private practice of medicine has also been suggested. 20
It is clear that something must be done by the medical profession
or by society as a whole to alleviate the strain of an overabundance of
malpractice actions. To completely grasp the situation it is necessary
to have some idea of how much of this litigation is well founded.
Again, there are no accurate figures and those figures which are
available are widely divergent. It is said that only one case out of
ten ever reaches the jury.21 It is also stated that lawyers reject the
cases of nine out of ten prospective plaintiffs who seek their advice
and that 30% of all malpractice cases have no merit.22 The reported
results of those cases that do come to trial are widely varied. By some
estimates the results are half and half, plaintiffs winning 50% of
the time.2 3 Other sources state that doctors are vindicated in as many
1
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as 90% of the cases tried.24 The most convincing statistics are the
results of compulsory arbitration carried out in Pima County, Arizona.
Of the sixty-five cases arbitrated there over a twelve year period
fifty-seven had no merit.
25
No matter what source is to be believed, it is obvious that at least
some of the thousands of medical malpractice suits brought each year
are brought without justifiable cause. This leads to the conclusion that
a number of doctors are in fact innocent of the charges of malpractice
which have been brought against them. Many doctors feel, and right-
fully so, that they are entitled to protection from the harassment of
invalid suits. 26
Working from the premise that the best defense is often a good
offense, certain positive steps can be taken to insure that physicians
are not set upon by every ex-patient who is dissatisfied with their
services.
Doctors, like ordinary people, are protected from defamation. This
protection extends to the practice of their profession. 27 It is certain
that a practicing member of the medical profession would have a clear
cause of action in defamation against anyone who had compared him
with a run-of-the-mill meat cutter.
A doctor's reputation clearly suffers when a malpractice action is
brought against him. Malpractice is an ill-famed word, nearly synony-
mous with quack and charlatan. 28 The definition of the term "malprac-
tice" varies from one jurisdiction to another. "In general it means the
wreaking of bodily harm by virtue of neglect, abandonment, or the
omission or commission of certain actions which fall below the stand-
ards of the average medical practitioner.129 It takes little imagination
to realize the harm a charge of medical malpractice might do a prac-
ticing physician.
It is conceded that a cause of action for defamation will not lie
where the allegations are made in the course of a civil proceeding.
The plaintiff in a malpractice suit enjoys immunity to publish false
and defamatory material as long as he stays within the scope of the
action. 0 However, this privilege does not extend to a suit that is
maliciously prosecuted.3'
The threat of a doctor counterattacking a malpractice suit with
a suit for malicious prosecution may cause a disgruntled patient and
24 Brooke, supra note 4, at 228.
2.) Id. at 229.
26 Id. at 226. So do many lawyers: Oleck, A Cure for Doctor-Lawyer Frictions, 7 CLEVE.-
MAR. L. Rav. 4-73 (1955).
27 Blende v. Hurst Publications, 93 P.2d 733, (Wash., 1939) ; Charging a Physician With
Incompetence in a Particular Case, 73 UNImTD STATES L. REV. 490 (1939).
28 Note, The Malpractice Dilemma, 9 W. Rms. L. REv. 471 (1958).
29 Brooke, supra note 4, at 225.
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his lawyer to think twice before bringng a frivolous or poorly founded
action. An action for malicious prosecution can be used as an effective
weapon to counter the threat of a malpractice suit, but it is necessary
to have a general understanding of the elements of malicious prose-
cution and their adaptability to the facts surrounding a medical mal-
practice suit. The attorney representing the physician is in a position
to watch his case develop as the events making up the facts occur.32
Malicious prosecution is an action not favored in the law.33 The
law of malicious prosecution represents an adjustment between the
conflicting interests of the parties to a civil suit. The plaintiff is
immune from any cause of action arising out of his good faith efforts
to secure a legal or equitable determination of his rights. The defend-
ant, at the same time, has a right to be free from unreasonable liti-
gation.3 4
The plaintiff in a suit for malicious prosecution must prove that a
suit was instituted against him without probable cause, that it has
been terminated in his favor, that there was a malicious motive in
instituting it, and that he has sustained damage as a result of the
maliciously prosecuted suit.3 5
A majority of the jurisdictions in this country allow suits for
malicious prosecution for the institution of a civil action where the
other elements are present.3 6
The matter of probable cause will vary from case to case. It is
usually a mixed question of law and fact. In a medical malpractice
action there is a lack of probable cause when the patient does not
honestly believe that the doctor is guilty of the malpractice charged,
or where he does believe that the doctor's actions constituted mal-
practice, that belief is unreasonable. 37
The second element that must be proved is the termination of the
prior suit in the present plaintiff's favor. Generally, any manner of
termination, which constitutes a final disposition, is sufficient. 38
The plaintiff must next prove the defendant's malicious intent in
instituting the malpractice proceedings. The question of malice is
almost exclusively a question of fact.39 The jury may infer malice
from the lack of probable cause. 0 It must be kept in mind that both
malice and lack of probable cause are separate elements of the tort
32 16 As'. JUR. Trials § 205 (1969).
33 52 AM. JuR. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 5 (1970).
34 Note, Malicious Prosecution-Essential Elements, 26 TENN. L. REV. 437 (1959).
35 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 853, 873 (3rd ed. 1964); Note, sutra
note 34; Cassidy, Malicious Prosecution-Its Scope and Purpose, 22 GEo. L. J. 343
(1934) ; 52 AM. JUR. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 6 (1970).36 W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 870.
37 Id. at 866; Note, supra note 34, at 439.38fBabb v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 479 P. 2nd 379 (1971);
supra note 34, at 441; 52 AM. JUR. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 42 (1970).
39 W. PROSSER, sutsra note 35, at 868; Note, supra note 34, at 440.
40 RESTATEMENT OF TorTS § 669 Comment (a) (1938) ; Henderson, supra note 34, at 440.
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of malicious prosecution; they must both be present.41 Generally, the
malice necessary to support an action for malicious prosecution result-
ing from a civil action is malice in fact. Malice in fact suggests the
presence of an evil, wrongful, or improper motive in bringing the
action for malpractice.
42
No damages will be presumed in an action founded upon a civil
suit. The plaintiff must prove actual damages.4" In many jurisdictions,
including Ohio, the general rule is that the party maliciously sued must
prove injury to or interference with his person or property. This re-
quirement precludes damages for injury to the reputation alone.44
It would appear that in jurisdictions where this rule is in effect, a
suit for malicious prosecution against a defendant who had brought
an unfounded suit for medical malpractice would be barred. There
would be no interference with or damage to the doctor's person or
property. The only thing that would suffer harm would be the doctor's
profession, and in some cases, his private reputation.
There is an exception to this rule where the original civil action
is based on lunacy or bankruptcy. These allegatons would amount to
defamation outside the courtroom.
Almost all jurisdictions allow the plaintiff in a malicious prosecu-
tion action to recover for damage done his reputation once actual
damages are proved.4 5 It also appears that in jurisdictions that do not
generally allow damages for injury to the reputation alone, actual
damages have been allowed. This is the case in Ohio. 46 It was stated
in Board of Education v. Marting,47 "Actions for malicious prosecution
are for injuries to an individual's character or reputation."
In a recent law review article the proposition was set forth that
injury to the reputation should be a basis for recovery in an action
for malicious prosecution. 48 The author of this article dealt with a
suit for malicious prosecution brought as a result of damages done to
the business reputation of an individual in a wrongfully instituted
insolvency action under Oregon law. Oregon is a jurisdiction that
allows recovery only where arrest of the person or seizure of property
can be proved.49
A businessman's reputation and a physician's professional reputa-
tion can easily be correlated. Perhaps, the professional reputation of
41 Note, supra note 34, at 440.
42 52 AM. JUR. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 48 (1970).
43W. PROSSER, supra note 35 at 875.
44 Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 482, 56 N. E. 198 (1900).
45 W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 875.
46 Perry v. Adjustable Awning, Inc., 117 Ohio App. 486, 192 N. E. 2d 672 (1962) ; Edging-
ton v. Glassmeyer, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 439, 168 N. E. 2d 425 (Ohio App. 1959).
47 217 N. E. 2d 712 (C. P. Fayette County 1966).
48 Note, Malicious Prosecution-Injury to Reputation as a Basis for Recovery, 6 WILLA-
METRE L. J. 173 (1970).
49 Id. at 179.
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a practicing physician should be given more consideration than the
business reputation of a merchant.
An examination of the article and the law used to formulate the
author's opinions reveals that the damages allowed for injury to a
person's reputation, arising from a maliciously prosecuted bankruptcy
action, have their roots in the theory that one who initiates a mal-
icious prosecution is liable for any harm done the defendant from
such an action.50
One of the first cases to recognize the value of a man's reputatio4
was Quartz Hill Consolidated Mining Co. v. Eyre.51 This case stands for
the concept that a businessman's credit is injured by a bankruptcy
proceeding before he has a chance to show that the accusation is
false.5 2
The author postulated that the defamation theory should be ex-
tended to any suit which is based on defamatory matter. He stated:
If the subject matter of the suit is of itself defamatory, it is
submitted that there is sufficient injury to support an action for
malicious prosecution; and an allegation of damage to reputation
should be adequate to survive a demurrer. The plaintiff must still
prove damage to his reputation and must also prove all other ele-
ments necessary to his cause of action. For example, a number of
cases hold that the institution of lunacy or insanity proceedings
is actionable. An action for malicious prosecution likewise should
be allowed where the charge is defamatory and where the other
elements of this cause of action are satisfied. A cause of action for
defamation will not lie when the allegations in a civil action are
defamatory, since all parties are accorded a judicial immunity;
however, the Restatement takes the position that this immunity
will not preclude a malicious prosecution suit if the subject matter
of the allegation is defamatory. 53
The author bases his contention, in part, on two cases. Savile v.
Roberts laid down a three-part test for malicious prosecution: damage
to the person, damage to property, and damage to a man's fame.54 The
second case, Wade v. National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma,55 holds that
the defamatory matter in a complaint is, without interference to per-
son or property, sufficient to sustain an action for malicious prosecu-
tion.
In summarizing his view the author states:
The Wade case, cited above, called attention to the fact that
the courts should not be used to inflict a wanton injury. This is in
accord with public policy. It is not to be expected that every civil
action will support malicious prosecution, but it is to be expected
that the courts will take care to protect the personal and/or busi-
50 Id. at 176.
5111 Q. B. D. 674 (1885).
52 Supra note 48, at 177; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 674, Comment (c) (1938).
53 Id. at 177-178.
54 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698).
55 1 1 4 - F. 277 (9th Cir. 1902).
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ness reputation of those who are maliciously sued. Chief Justice
Holt's threefold test for damages to person, property, and reputa-
tion is complete and fair. If the pleadings in the original suit are
defamatory, they should be actionable without a showing of inter-
ference with person or property. This can be reconciled with the
majority rule in that these damages to reputation, resulting from
a malicious prosecution, are damages that do "not ordinarily re-
sult from all suits maintained for like causes". Oregon has rejected
the underlying theory of section 678 of the Restatement of Torts,
but it would seem both logical and desirable to accept and extend
the theory of this section to all civil actions where the defendant
has suffered an injury to his reputation. It is submitted that this
more liberal rule will tend to discourage those who might other-
wise bring groundless suits maliciously."
This more liberal rule of allowing damages in a malicious prosecu-
tion proceeding could work as an effective means to counter the in-
crease in medical malpractice actions.
5P Supra note 4-8, at 190-181.
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